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RECENT DECISIONS
Conflict of Laws: Post-accident Change of Domicile by Wrong-
ful Death Defendant. On August 10, 1961, Earl Miller, a resident
of Harrison, New York, embarked on a short business trip to Bruns-
wick, Maine, where his brother Robert resided and where they had,
mutual business interests. On August 12, while a passenger in a car
driven by Robert and owned by Robert's wife, who was also a Maine
domiciliary, Earl Miller was killed when the vehicle crashed into a
bridge railing. The automobile had been insured and registered in Maine
up to the date of the accident.
In November, 1961, Robert and his wife established residence in
New York, where they had lived before moving to Maine. In June,
1962, the decedent's wife, also a resident of New York, brought a
wrongful death action in New York against Robert and his wife. As a
partial defense, the defendants asserted the $20,000 limitation on re-
coveries for wrongful death in effect in Maine at the time of decedent's
death.' The trial court granted a motion by the plaintiff to dismiss the
partial defense and the appellate division unanimously affirmed.2 In
Miller v. Miller,3 the court of appeals, in a 4-3 decision, affirmed the
appellate division, but on a basis different from that used by the lower
courts.
The appellate division had relied on the authority of Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 4 a 1961 New York wrongful death action
arising out of the crash in Massachusetts of an airplane en route from
New York to Massachusetts. The decedent and his beneficiaries were
New York residents and defendant was a common carrier operating
and soliciting business in New York, but chartered and headquartered
in Massachusetts. The court of appeals ruled in Kilberg that although
plaintiff's substantive rights would be determined by the law of the
place of death, i.e., Massachusetts; nevertheless, the Massachusetts
statutory restriction on damages recoverable was a matter of procedure
rather than substantive right5 and would not be enforced by a New
'Law of Aug. 28, 1957, ch. 188, [1957] Me. Laws 125, as amended, ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2552 (1964). The amended provision limiting recovery
to $30,000 was repealed prior to the litigation arising out of the Miller accident.
Law of Sept. 16, 1961, ch. 255, [19611 Me. Laws 301.
2 Miller v. Miller, 28 App. Div. 2d 899, 282 N.Y.S.2d 35 (2d Dep't. 1967).322 N.Y2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
4 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). The airline crash
which was the subject of the Kilberg case also gave rise to the Pearson case,
which held that New York's refusal to apply the Massachusetts wrongful
death recovery limitation was not a violation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 199 F.
Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1962), aff'd en banc, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962). See generally, Currie,
The Constitution and the Choice of Law, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9 (1958).
59 N.Y.2d at 41, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
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York court because of New York's long-standing constitutional policy
against limiting recovery in wrongful death proceedings.6
In Miller, the court of appeals affirmed the appellate division not
on the authority of Kilberg, but rather on the authority of Babcock v.
Jackson.7 The court in Babcock had ruled that Ontario's guest statute
did not bar an action between New York residents for personal injuries
arising out of an auto accident in Ontario. In so ruling, the court aban-
doned the traditional conflict of laws rule that lex loci delicti, or the
law of the place of the wrong, invariably governs the rights and lia-
bilities of parties to a tort action.8 The court adopted the "center of
gravity" or "grouping of contacts" test. Using this test, the court com-
pares and weighs the various "contacts" of the states involved in the
tortious transaction and gives controlling effect to the law of the state
whose contacts with the parties or with the transaction are most signi-
ficant. In Farber v. Smolack,9 the court extended the Babcock rule
from personal injury actions to wrongful death actions and declared
that
[W]hen a fatal accident occurs out of State and New York ...
is the jurisdiction having "the most significant relationship" with
the issue presented, . . . the New York wrongful death statute
determines the rights of the victim's survivors."
Modern conflict of laws doctrines have undergone significant changes
from the early doctrine which was based on a theory of comity. Under
the comity doctrine, courts held that when a foreign law should govern,
that law was "allowed to operate" in the forum for the purposes of the
particular case.11 The theory smacked too heavily of extraterritoriality
for many jurists and around the turn of the 19th century, the theory
was supplanted by the "vested rights" theory. Proponents of this theory
postulated that at the moment a tort occurs a right to damages accrues
6 "The right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting
in death shall never be abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall not be
subject to any statutory limitation." N.Y. Const. art. I, § 18, renumbered § 16
by the Constitutional Convention of 1938.
712 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). See, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in the Conflict of Laws, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1963).
8 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 377-97 (1934).
9 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967). The Farber decision
had as its precursor Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d
337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965), a wrongful death action in
which the New York Court of Appeals, as a disinterested forum, was called
upon in a wrongful death action to choose between the law of Pennsylvania
and the law of Maryland. In deciding that Pennsylvania law applied, the
court ruled that wrongful death statutes could be given extraterritorial effect.
Accord, Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
10 20 N.Y.2d at 204, 229 N.E.2d at 40, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
11See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS, pt. 1, at 4-6 (1959); J. STORY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) ; Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the
Conflict of Laws-One Hundred Years After, 48 HARV. L. REV. 15 (1934).
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in the victim with a corresponding liability in the tortfeasor. 1 2 Because
of the strict concepts of the territoriality of law, the right would accrue
only if the place of the wrong provided it and only to the extent that
the place of the wrong provided it. This is the position of the Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws'13 and is the majority rule today.'4
The vested rights theory provides predictability, facilitates pre-trial
settlement, and simplifies litigation on the issue of which law governs
a case with multi-state aspects. The theory was regarded almost uni-
versally as a good legal tool until the post-World War II era. Since
the end of the war, the significant advances in motor vehicle and air-
craft technology, and the general increase in individual wealth have re-
sulted in increased traveling, more accidents, and a growing dissatisfac-
tion with the limitations of the vested rights theory.'15 Opponents of
the theory have argued that although the rule was appropriate in the
bygone era of slow transportation and relatively infrequent interjuris-
dictional travel, its rigid application in the era of interstate higways and
congested airways has worked unnecessary hardships. In airplane cases
especially, the place of death is often truly fortuitous and, in some
12 See 2 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378.2 (1935); A.
EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS, pt. 1, at 6-13 (1959) ; see also, Mr. Justice
Holmes in Slater v. Mexican National R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904):
The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of
was subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an
obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the per-
son, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found.
13 RESTATEIENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra, note 8. See also H. GOODRICH, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 260, 302 (3d ed. 1949); R. LEFLAR, THE LAW OF THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS, §§ 110, 114 (1959); G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS,
183-86 (3d ed. 1963).
14 For recent cases adhering to the doctrine, see Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594
(Del. 1965); Fessenden v. Smith, 255 Iowa 1170, 124 N.W.2d 554 (1963);
McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965); Nicholson v. Atlas
Assurance Corp., 156 So. 2d 245 (La. App. 1963); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio
St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965); Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rogers,
398 P.2d 520 (Okla. 1965) ; Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963);
Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); Glick v. Ballentine
Produce, Inc., 343 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1965); Goranson v. Capital Airlines,
Inc., 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965).
IsSee D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965); B. CURRIE, SELECTED
ESSAYS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) ; A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 219-23 (1962); H. GOODRICH and E. SCOLES, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 165-66 (4th ed. 1964); A. VON MEHREN and D. TRAUTMAN,
THE LAW OF MULTI-STATE PROBLEMS (1965); Cook, The Logical and Legal
Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 457 (1924) ; Currie, Notes on
Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L. J. 171; Currie,
Conflict, Crisis, and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L. 3. 1; Currie,
Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958) ; Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict
of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1961); Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant
Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 700(1963); Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 YALE L. J.
595 (1960) ; Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1951) ;
Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL
L. Q. 215 (1963) ; Conments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development
in the Conflict of Laws, supra, note 7. Comment, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 762 (1963)
Note, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1452 (1965); Note, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 633 (1966).
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cases, even impossible to determine. 1 The position of the vested rights
theory as a postulate of American law has started to give way to the
"center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" doctrine, adopted in the
landmark Babcock case. The center of gravity doctrine first was used to
resolve conflict problems in multi-state contract and trust cases,17 but
later the doctrine was extended to tort cases. It is the theory favored
in the proposed Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.' s
An analogue of the "grouping of contacts" doctrine is the theory
of "governmental interest analysis." By ascertaining the purposes under-
lying the laws which appear to conflict, the courts are able to resolve
many instances of "false conflicts."' 9 For example, assume that two
Wisconsin residents, A and B, drive to state X. While in X, the Wis-
consinites are involved in a one-car accident and only A, the guest in
B's automobile, is injured. A sues B in a Wisconsin court for damages
arising from his personal injuries. State X has a guest statute im-
munizing an automobile driver from liability to his guest who was in-
jured as a result of the host's simple negligence. The purposes of state
X's statute, as enunciated by X's legislature and supreme court, are:
(1) to assure that injured third parties are compensated before injured
guests; (2) to safeguard a fund for resident creditors in state X who
incur expenses arising out of the accident and; (3) to prevent col-
lusive suits between guests and hosts in order to protect insurers in
state X. Since, in our one auto accident, (a) only a Wisconsin resident
is injured, (b) no insurer in state X is involved, and (c) no residents
of state X incurred expenses arising out of the accident, then no govern-
mental policy of state X would be furthered by the application of X's
guest statute in the Wisconsin lawsuit. Consequently, there should be
no impediment to the Wisconsin court's implementation of this state's
policy of compensating injured guests for injuries negligently caused
by a host driver.20 With the decision in Miller v. Miller, it seems clear
16 Long v. Pan American World Airways, 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266
N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965). The case arose from the crash of an aircraft near the
Pennsylvania-Maryland border. In which state the passengers actually died
was impossible to determine.
17 See Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, 50 A.L.R.2d 246 (1954);
Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 146 (Proposed Official
Draft, Part II, 1968). See also H. GOODRICH and E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS,§§ 92, 93 (4th ed. 1964).
19 See generally Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Lav Problem, 47 HARV. L.
REv. 173 (1933) ; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L.
REV. 657 (1959) ; Comment, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 1448 (1965) ; Note, 49 1MARO.
L. REv. 633 (1966).2oAn interesting case which is in many respects similar to the hypothetical is
Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965), a
post-Babcock personal injury action which arose out of an automobile accident
in Colorado and which involved two New York residents as the sole litigants.
Both parties to the action had proceeded independently to Colorado to attend
summer school and, while there, they became acquainted. During a short
excursion, the plaintiff, while a guest in the defendant's auto, was injured in
[Vol. 52
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that New York has adopted "governmental interest analysis" as its
choice of law test.
Writing for the majority, Judge Keating noted that New York had
earlier abandoned the traditional vested rights theory.
The difficulty which we found with this rule was that in giving
controlling significance to the law of that jurisdiction in which
the accident took place, without considering the purpose of the
laws in conflict, the rule "ignored the interest which jurisdic-
tions other than where the tort occurred may have in the resolu-
tion of that particular issue .... 21
[T]he law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the
litigation will be applied and . . . the facts or contacts which
obtain significance in defining State interests are those which re--
late to the purpose of the particular law in conflict.22
The issue before the court in Miller was the manner in which the
wife and children of a New York decedent were to be compensated for
the economic loss they suffered as a result of the death of their "bread-
winner." New York's public policy, embodied in the state constitution,
is that wrongful death actions shall not be subject to limitations of
damages; that is, that victims of wrongful killings should be fully com-
pensated. At the time of Mr. Miller's accident, Maine's public policy,
manifested in its wrongful death statute, was that wrongful death re-
coveries should be limited to not more than $20,000.
Since the plaintiff was an injured New York resident, the New York
court had a substantial interest in applying New York's law of full
compensation 2 3 Moreover, the majority reasoned that there were no
significant countervailing considerations which would warrant rejec-
tion of New York's law in favor of that of Maine. Since the issue pre-
sented involved only the nature of the remedy and not a standard of
conduct, the court saw no possibility of unfairness to a party who had
patterned his conduct in reliance on Maine law. Since the defendants
were no longer residents of Maine at the time of litigation, the majority
reasoned that Maine's interest in providing remedies for its residents
did not preclude application of New York law. The majority perceived
a collision with an automobile driven by a Kansas resident. In the ensuing
personal injury action, the Kansas resident was not a party. The New York
defendant raised as a defense the Colorado guest statute. In upholding the
defense, the court of appeals ruled that Colorado had the most significant
contacts with the issue of host-guest immunity. In a vigorous dissent, Judge
Jasen urged that the case presented only a "false conflict" since Colorado
could be in no way concerned about remedies available in foreign law suits
having no effect in Colorado or on Colorado residents. Although never ex-
pressly overruled, it is doubtful that Dym represents the current law in New
York.2122 N.Y.2d at 15, 237 N.E.2d at 878, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 736 (emphasis added).
22 Id. at 15-16, 237 N.E.2d at 879, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 737 (emphasis added).
23 The state of New York, for example, would have to provide for the plaintiff
if the loss of her husband rendered her destitute. N.Y. SOC. SERVICES LAW§ 131 (McKinney 1966).
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no problem of unfairness to the defendants' insurance carrier since the
insurer could not have relied in any way on Maine's statutory limitation
in setting premium rates.2 4 In sum, the majority seemed to consider
Miller a "false conflict" case.
Writing for the dissenters,25 Judge Breitel attacked the majority's
reasoning as well as its conclusion. The "false conflict" conclusion
drawn by the majority was based on a consideration of post-accident
events which, the dissenters believed, should not have been considered
in the choice of law deliberations.
The court's determination that New York law should govern ap-
peared to turn on the fact that the defendants at the time of litigation
no longer lived in Maine, but were residents of New York. Had the
defendants remained domiciled in Maine, it seems likely that, under
any test, their liability would have been determined under New York
law. Under the vested rights doctrine, no choice of law problem would
have arisen, since only the lex loci delicti could be applied. 6 Under
"grouping of contacts" doctrine or "governmental interest analysis,"
the choice of law problem would not be so simple to resolve. Nonthe-
less, considering Maine's substantial contacts with the accident and its
legislatively expressed policy of protecting its residents from wrongful
24 "[A]n analysis of the actuarial process as well as an inquiry to the Insur-
ance Commission of the State of Maine reveals that the presence of the
limitations had no substantial affect on insurance premiums, and a refusal to
apply Maine law here will have an infinitesimal effect, if that, on insurance
rates in Maine. See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-
The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L. J. 554, 560-71)." 22 N.Y.2d at
21, 237 N.E.2d at 882, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
25 judge Jasen concurred in Judge Breitel's dissenting opinion. Judge Scileppi
dissented on the authority of Dym v. Gordon, supra, note 21.
26 The statement perhaps is made too brashly. The defendant in Kilberg, supra,
note 4, was a corporate domiciliary of Massachusetts at the time of the
wrongful death proceedings. The New York court, without abrogating the
vested rights doctrine, avoided the application of Massachusetts' law limiting
wrongful death recoveries simply by characterizing damages as a matter of
procedure which need not be enforced in a foreign court. The strained
characterization of damages as a procedural matter in Kilberg could be ap-
plied in Miller to defeat Maine's statutory limitations. This is in fact the treat-
ment accorded the case by the appellate division and the trial court. See
notes 2 and 4 and accompanying text.
However, the differences in the nature and activities of the defendants in
Kilberg and Miller might have led the Court of Appeals in Miller, in consider-
ing the totality of circumstances, to decline to use the Kilberg characteriza-
tion. The Kilberg defendant, Northeast Airlines, was a large corporation
engaged in providing transportation for profit, whereas the defendants in
Miller were a small entrepreneur and his wife who were not transporting
the decedent for pay but merely as an incident to a business and social visit.
Unlike the Miller defendants, Northeast Airlines had engaged for years in
substantial, state-wide business activities in New York. All the significant
contacts, with the exception of the place of destination and place of death,
were New York oriented. Thus, it was not shocking that the court refused
to give effect to the Massachusetts statutory limitation. In Miller, on the
other hand, all the significant contacts, at least up to and including the time
of the accident, were Maine-related. It would be' no more difficult for the




death judgments in excess of $20,000, it would seem that Maine's law
would be considered more appropriate than New York's.
The dissent questioned whether the decision were not likely to dis-
courage defendants, actual or potential, from moving to New York or,
on the other hand, if it were not likely to encourage "collusive change of
domicile to fix broader liability upon the insurer," where the case in-
volves litigation between family members.2 7 Both questions had been
dismissed in the majority opinion as contradictory and speculative. The
perfunctory dismissal seems an inadequate response to the challenge.
The forum shopping questions are patently not contradictory since
it is only when the litigation is between family members, with an in-
surer as the real party in interest, that the defendant would be inclined
to establish residence in New York. Otherwise, the defendant pre-
sumably would be extremely reluctant to settle in New York, for fear
that the state's liberal choice of law doctrine would impoverish him. If
a non-family-member defendant were heavily insured, of course, he
would be less concerned about the possibility of a large judgment being
rendered against him. His insurer, on the other hand, would be quite
concerned.
Nor is forum shopping a "speculative" issue. The majority apparently
were satisfied that in fact the defendants were not motivated by forum
shopping considerations in moving to New York.
There may be times where policy considerations such as a desire
to prevent forum shopping would require us to ignore changes
in domicile after the accident .... In the instant case, however,
the change in domicile has nothing whatever to do with a desire
to achieve a more favorable legal climate, and we see no reason
to ignore the facts as they are presented at the time of the liti-
gation.2
8
The decision was rendered on an appeal from a pre-trial order and it is
not apparent how the majority reached its conclusion on the defendants'
motivation-in-fact in changing their residence. In drawing their con-
clusion that the defendants were not collusively forum shopping, how-
ever, the court may have opened a Pandora's box of perplexing ques-
tions, for, after Miller, trial courts faced with a similar case will have
to determine, as a necessary consideration in the choice of law deter-
mination, whether the defendant's change of domicile was undertaken
in good faith.
The reference to the defendants' good faith raises more questions
than it answers. How does the factual question of good faith affect the
roles of the judge and jury in the choice of law process? How is the
issue raised? Should any presumptions obtain? Is the burden on the
2722 N.Y.2d at 33, 237 N.E.2d at 889, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 751.28Id. at 22, 237 N.E.2d at 882-83, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
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plaintiff to establish the defendant's good faith or must the defendant's
insurer intervene 9 to prove that defendant changed his residence for
forum shopping purposes? What of the effect of the defendant's move
on his duty to cooperate with the insurer in the defense of the action?
What of the move's effect on the insurer's duty to defend and the con-
flict of interest problems inherent in the trial of such a case?
Considering the severe hardships occasionally wrought by statutory
limitations, it is not surprising that courts sometimes strain to avoid
enforcing them. However, the ruling in Miller that a post-accident
change of domicile is a relevant "contact" to be considered in choice of
law deliberations seems to have increased unnecessarily the difficulty
of determining prior to litigation what law governs a Miller-type case.
The court could have avoided the uncertainty likely to arise in future
cases by disregarding the post-accident change of domicile, finding
Maine law applicable under the Babcock test, and by reasserting the
validity of the Kilberg rule to defeat the statutory limitation.30 Al-
though the substance/procedure characterization is strained at best and
simply false at worst, nonetheless, use of the technique would accomp-
lish the same result as that reached in Miller, i.e., full compensation,
and at the same time it would increase predictability in future choice
of law cases. The forum shopping problem discussed in the dissent to
Miller would not be solved by applying the Kilberg doctrine. However,
it seems an inescapable fact of life today that, just as there are "good"
states in which to domicile a corporation,"' so there are "good" states
in which to be a personal injury plaintiff. Nothing short of a reversion
by all jurisdictions to the pre-Kilberg vested rights doctrine will stop
forum shopping in multi-state personal injury cases.3 2
CHARLES D. CLAUSEN
Poverty Law-King v. Smith and "Man-In-The-Home": The
Aid and Services to Needy Families with Children (AFDC) program
was established by the Social Security Act of 1935.' The program was
29 In a "direct action" state, the insurer would be a party to the action from its
inception and would be in a position to present to the court the issue of
whether the insured changed his residence in order to expand his insurer's
liability.
30 The argument against applying the Kilberg rationale to a Miller fact situation,
made in note 27, supra, is useful only if the court should desire to limit lia-
bility. Since the court in Miller felt that the insurer was the real party in
interest, it was interested in extending liability rather than limiting it.
31 See Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of
1967, 117 U. PA. L. Rav. 861 (1969).
32 See La Brum, The Fruits of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty, and
Forum Shopping, 54 A.B.A.J. 747 (1968).
1 The original program was known as "Aid to Dependent Children," under
Act of Aug. 15, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 627. This act was amended in 1962 by
Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, Title I, § 104(a) (4), (c) (2), 76
Stat. 185-6, and the name was changed to its present form. Hereinafter the
program will be referred to as AFDC.
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